

Colombia in deep crisis

This document analyzes some aspects of the deep crisis that Colombia is facing under the administration of President Gustavo Petro. Since his election in 2022, violence and organized crime have significantly increased, with criminal groups now controlling approximately 65% of the country. The government has struggled to implement effective solutions, while international responses have remained mostly passive. A key factor in this dire situation is Petro's leadership style, which has deepened political polarization and division within Colombian society, fostering an environment of violence. Petro's rhetoric and policies, which closely align with his close amigo, Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, have undermined democratic institutions and promoted the use of violence as a political tool. Under Petro's "Total Peace" initiative, criminal groups such as the ELN, dissident factions of the FARC, the Gulf Clan, and other far-right criminal organizations have gained power, contributing to the destabilization of the country.

Meanwhile, the Colombian economy is in decline, marked by rising inflation, unemployment, and a drop in foreign investment, all exacerbated by controversial policy changes in the oil and mining sectors. Additionally, Colombia has become an increasingly significant hub for human trafficking, with growing reports of exploitation linked to Petro's permissive immigration policies. On the other hand, Petro's diplomatic ties with regimes like those of Venezuela, Russia, and Iran have strained Colombia's traditional foreign policy principles. As violence and instability increase, international aid has increasingly been directed toward supporting Petro's revisionist agenda, often at the expense of human rights and democratic values. The situation demands a reevaluation of the "Total Peace" policy, serious international commitment, and more transparent governance to prevent the empowerment of criminal groups and safeguard Colombia's democratic future.

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Colombia at war¹. In less than two and a half years, the country has experienced a resurgence of violence and crime unseen in the past 25 years. Organized crime now controls 65% of the country's territory², while the national government remains complacent³ and the international community largely silent. The country is home to more than 8 million displaced persons, at least five million of whom live in permanent confinement⁴. This alarming situation highlights a clear failure of national security⁵. In addition, at least three million Colombians have fled the country since August 2022⁶.

This multifaceted crisis⁷ is exacerbated by President Petro⁸, whose policies and pomposity seem to be inspired by his close ally and best amigo, Venezuelan dictator Maduro, mirroring his policies and rhetoric⁹.

An oppressive regime

Since taking office in August 2022, Colombia's president has fostered a narrative of hatred¹⁰ and violence, deepening social divisions and contributing to an increasingly polarized society¹¹. The Vice President, the first Afro-Colombian woman to hold this position, has been particularly aggressive in exploiting resentment¹² and hostility¹³ against her political opponents and the country's white population¹⁴. The international community, as well as the national government, the ruling party el Pacto Histórico, find it *cute* that the Vice President expresses herself in this way¹⁵. This situation is worrisome because it underscores the continuing missteps

of governments and diplomatic corps in war zones¹⁶. Such attitudes can perpetuate a cycle of violence that could lead to civil war or worsen the already *fragile* situation in Colombia.

Indeed, political violence is on the rise worldwide, driven by a disillusioned society that increasingly sees it as a solution rather than a threat. In Colombia, President Petro and Vice President Márquez often capitalize on this sentiment by rallying their supporters with impassioned political diatribes¹⁷. They consider it acceptable to use violence to pressure Congress, the judiciary, the electoral system¹⁸, and the roughly 75% of Colombians who do not support their policies¹⁹.

In fact, President Petro quickly showed autocratic tendencies from the beginning of his presidency, having come to power through a relatively democratic election²⁰. Since then, he has sought to dismantle checks on executive power through populism, polarization²¹, and post-truth grandiloquence²². He begins on a milder note, maintaining the facade of democracy while subtly undermining it²³ and gradually moving toward despotism²⁴.

In addition to the rise in violent incidents, there has been an alarming increase in tolerance for such behavior under his administration²⁵. The Colombian president has even suggested that violence is an acceptable response, inadvertently encouraging the nation's youth to engage in a disturbing cycle of aggression²⁶ in support of his policies²⁷.

A former member²⁸ of the M-19 movement²⁹, since taking office President Petro has urged his coalition - el Pacto Histórico, supporters, and even a Spaniard who received expedited Colombian citizenship³⁰ - to organize demonstrations under the M-19's flags³¹. This movement is known for its involvement in the Palace of Justice tragedy³², which is often referred to as a genocide in Colombia, along with other crimes and robberies. Although the M-19 has been granted amnesty³³, this does not absolve them of their criminal actions. The amnesty does not erase the reality of these crimes³⁴.

By orchestrating protests³⁵ that prominently display the M-19 flag, the Colombian president is attempting to revictimize judges throughout the country, particularly those in high courts³⁶ and independent institutions³⁷. His main goal appears to be to pressure these officials, which violates international standards for the protection of victims and their families³⁸, as well as Colombia's constitutional order. This behavior underscores the authoritarian nature of President Petro's government.

Total Peace

Through its policy of Total Peace (Paz Total)³⁹, the Colombian government has empowered organized crime⁴⁰, which includes at least five major cartels and 23 drug gangs operating in 31 of the country's 32 departments. These groups control at least 456 of Colombia's 1,119 municipalities⁴¹. Historically, they have been major supporters of the current government during its opposition phase⁴², throughout the presidential campaign⁴³, and now as partners in the Total Peace Talks⁴⁴. This president has systematically allowed these and other criminal organizations to consolidate their control over illegally occupied territories and subjugate local communities⁴⁵.

Criminal groups such as the ELN (National Liberation Army), Clan del Golfo, and Disidencias Estado Mayor Central (former FARC), Segunda Marquetalia (former FARC), among others, have a combined membership of approximately 20,000⁴⁶. The Total Peace Initiative has enabled their growth and increased their access to illicit resources⁴⁷, strengthening its power to dominate communities neglected by the national government⁴⁸.

Similarly, whenever the national government lacks a congressional majority or faces unfavorable court rulings - beyond the presidential insults⁴⁹ - it threatens the country with

potential violence reminiscent of the 2021 upheaval. Senior officials, including the current Minister of Health, frequently issue warnings, summoning, "Do you want another violent strike"⁵⁰?

These illegal armed groups and transnational organized crime syndicates collaborate effectively, resulting in a significant shift in power dynamics. This cooperation has resulted in increased funding and specialization in key areas throughout Colombia and the region⁵¹. Their transnational allies include Hezbollah, a strong supporter of the ELN, Hamas, and Maduro's dictatorial regime, as well as the Sinaloa Cartel from Mexico and the Tren de Aragua, which supports both the Venezuelan regime and Colombian criminal groups⁵².

Since taking office in 2022, President Petro has appointed some of the most controversial figures with criminal backgrounds as "gestores de paz" (peace managers). However, this practice is not new. It dates back to 1997, when Law 418 established the role of peace manager for individuals with ties to illegal armed groups. Under the law, these individuals are often released from prison to support humanitarian efforts or facilitate peace negotiations with such groups. At least, three factors distinguish President Petro's appointments from those of other governments: first, he is honoring the promise he made during his presidential campaign by securing their support; second, he is appointing the most ruthless criminals; and third, it is President Petro who determines whether they are telling the truth or not.

The Petro regime has formed a powerful and feared *alliance* with the Maduro dictatorship, the Colombian ruling party—El Pacto Histórico—and its Total Peace partners. This coalition exerts considerable influence at the local, national, and international levels, carrying significant geopolitical implications for both Colombia and the broader region⁵³. From the very beginning of this government, the alliance has pursued a strategy of relentless rhetorical attacks and armed aggression against the Colombian people, aiming to establish *permanent* control over the country.

Cocaine crops

Colombia set a record for cocaine production in 2023⁵⁴, rising from 1,738 metric tons in 2022 to 2,664 metric tons—a 53% increase. Coca cultivation grew by 10%, from 230,000 to 253,000 hectares. This made Colombia the world's top producer of cocaine. Unlike the 2021-2022 rise, which was concentrated in Putumayo, the 2023 increase was more widespread. Coca production rose in 16 of 19 departments, with Cauca and Nariño most affected.

The Pacific region saw significant expansion, especially in Cauca and Chocó, where new coca fields have been established with high planting densities. These areas resemble complex productive enclaves, making intervention more difficult. Coca cultivation is concentrated near drug exit routes, with high sowing densities in certain zones. In contrast, other areas show a decline in commercialization and market activity.

Violence continues post-Peace Accord, driven by groups like the ELN, Clan del Golfo, and dissident FARC factions. These organizations, linked to transnational organized crime, are central to the ongoing instability. The Colombian government is negotiating Total Peace talks, focused on addressing cocaine production and trafficking. Data from the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), highlighting a landscape of violence driven by the afore mentioned organized crime. This includes factions of the dissident FARC-EP operating in the territory, coordinated by 'Iván Mordisco'⁵⁵ and 'Segunda Marquetalia,' as well as the involvement of the ELN far left paramilitary with its Southwestern and Western fronts.

Massacres

During the last year of the previous government in Colombia, which was marked by the presidential campaign, almost every day the television news opened with reports of massacres

taking place throughout the country⁵⁶. Since the arrival of this government in August 2022, the number of massacres has triplicated, but the media remains silent. The same can be said of the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and civil society organizations (NGOs) in Colombia. The victims of these massacres, often carried out by government allies under the guise of "total peace," remain uncounted.

Colombian NGOs, many of which have leftist or far-left affiliations, have largely remained silent on critical issues. However, INDEPAZ, an NGO allied with the national government, reported that Colombia has experienced 246 massacres since 2022⁵⁷. It's important to note that INDEPAZ does not have access to accurate information about approximately 65% of the territory controlled by President Petro's allies in the Total Peace negotiations. Because these organizations provide information to international think tanks, these killings have gone largely unreported both nationally and internationally⁵⁸ for nearly two and a half years.

This situation is not accidental. It is the result of several converging factors: significant pressure from the Alliance to silence certain Colombian NGOs and parts of the international community, as well as substantial financial resources from the partners in the Total Peace Talks to suppress certain media information⁵⁹ and control social networks⁶⁰.

Environmental leaders in Colombia represent a diverse group among the many victims of assassination. In 2023 alone, 79 of these leaders were killed, representing 40% of the global total, according to Global Witness⁶¹. This alarming trend intensified in the second half of 2022. Despite these figures, the United Nations, the Ombudsman's Office, and two Colombian NGOs - INDEPAZ and PARES - choose to present data from 2016 to 2023⁶². This approach seems to obscure the shortcomings of the current government in protecting environmental defenders.

Since the end of 2018, la Colombia Humana, el Polo Democrático and la Alianza Verde, now part of the ruling party - Pacto Histórico - they have moved their communication center to Venezuela, which has one of the most intimidating bot armies in the region, backed by Russia. Maduro's government and its allies, such as the ELN, Hezbollah and the former FARC, played a decisive role in the violence and killings that erupted during the 2019, 2020 and 2021 protests in Colombia. During this period of unrest, numerous messages were sent from Venezuela via WhatsApp and SMS, spreading false information to incite violence⁶³.

This information was readily accepted by the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights without thorough investigation. This is not to suggest, however, that disturbing events did not occur or should be concealed. Rather, it shows that the international community relied on a single source of information whose propaganda funded both Maduro and President Petro's allies currently participating in the Total Peace talks.

The former opposition leader and current president of Colombia has attempted to claim that he and his party were under surveillance by the former government, although he has provided no evidence⁶⁴. This claim seems to serve as a justification for the Maduro regime's involvement in social media operations in Colombia. In fact, both his minister of communications⁶⁵ and other senior officials appointed by President Petro have formally denied any such surveillance.

In democratic countries, criminal and terrorist organizations are closely monitored while upholding the rule of law. Between 2018 and 2022, and during Petro's presidential campaign, he and his allies engaged -in Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela - with groups such as the ELN and former FARC members -entities involved in organized crime. This engagement likely drew considerable scrutiny from government authorities. Recently, as president, Petro has expressed concern about this surveillance, interpreting it as a national conspiracy targeting him and his associates⁶⁶, including organized crime.

Colombia's attorney general, a comrade of the president who nominated her for selection by the Colombian Supreme Court from a pool of three candidates, is a close friend and former

colleague of the defense minister, one of the president's key collaborators. She has prioritized the president's accusations over her office's most important cases⁶⁷, particularly the investigation of the president's son, who has accused the presidential campaign of receiving drug money. While she claims to be able to prove that Pegasus was purchased in Colombia, she has yet to identify who made the purchase or who used it, as she does not have that information⁶⁸.

President Petro has not denied traveling to Cuba, nor has he refuted that family members, friends, and party colleagues worked with organized crime leaders between 2018 and 2022, particularly to coordinate rallies and his presidential campaign. This was widely reported and made the situation clear to Colombians⁶⁹. However, the international community often misinterprets organized crime such as the ELN, romanticizing them as guerrilla fighters who stand up for the poor and even uphold chastity.

The ELN operates as a major organized crime group based in Havana, Cuba⁷⁰. Its activities-trafficking, kidnapping, and the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Venezuela and Colombia-have made it extremely *wealthy*. The ELN is a major perpetrator of ecological crimes in both Colombia and Venezuela⁷¹, involved in illegal mining, deforestation, and systematic attacks on oil pipelines in Colombia. The ELN's brutal attack on the General Santander Police School resulted in the deaths of 22 cadets. President Petro's supporters have framed this tragedy as an attack on former President Duque, using it for political leverage. However, this act was a direct attack on Colombian democracy - an aspect largely overlooked by the international community. The ELN, along with Hezbollah⁷² and Hamas, is supported by both Maduro and Petro, as this alliance serves their personal interests and those of various former mayors in Colombia.

It is important to mention here that with their Total Peace partners, since the arrival of Gustavo Petro to the presidency of Colombia, landmines have doubled throughout the country, killing at least 99 people during 2023.

A strangled economy

Many economists and public finance experts⁷³ describe the current state of the Colombian economy under President Petro as even worse than during the coronavirus pandemic⁷⁴. While often referred to as “the government of change,” many believe these changes have led to negative outcomes⁷⁵. Here are some key reasons often cited for the challenges facing the Colombian economy under President Petro:

Economic Policies: Critics argue that some of Petro's economic policies have created uncertainty, particularly regarding tax reforms and changes in oil and mining regulations, which have historically been significant revenue sources for the country. **Inflation:** Colombia has experienced rising inflation, impacting purchasing power and overall economic stability. This has been exacerbated by global economic conditions and domestic factors. **Unemployment:** High unemployment rates persist, especially in the wake of the pandemic, affecting overall economic recovery and growth. **Investment Decline:** There are concerns about decreased foreign investment due to the perceived risks associated with policy changes and regulatory environments. **Social Unrest:** Protests and social movements have arisen in reaction to various government actions, often disrupting economic activity and exacerbating instability. In response, the national government has sponsored counter-protests that employ hate speech and incite violence. **Inequality:** Persistent issues of inequality and poverty have been highlighted, with the government struggling to implement effective measures to address these long-standing problems. These factors contribute to a complex economic landscape, leading many to express concern about the direction in which the country is heading.

The exploration and exploitation of natural resources deserves special mention. During COP28, the Colombian government presented its commitment to environmental protection in a way that some observers found misleading. There seems to be a discrepancy between the actual situation on the ground and the government's portrayal of it. First, contrary to what was said in Dubai (COP 28), the government has never organized a referendum or initiated any process to allow the Colombian people to vote on ending the exploration and exploitation of natural resources⁷⁶. On the contrary, the government has promised to increase the production of oil and other natural resources, as stated by the president of ECOPETROL⁷⁷, the national oil company. Second, the Colombian Congress has never banned the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Instead, the ruling party, has supported these activities, especially in the border region with Venezuela. There, illegal groups such as the ELN, Hezbollah, and organized crime - in collaboration with the Venezuelan army - control the extraction of gold and another mineral.

President Petro during COP16 continued to state that Colombia will no longer exploit natural resources⁷⁸, even though the country will soon suffer shortages of gas and oil. The *real* reason behind the government's decision is to import oil and gas as a major partner of the dictator Maduro to support Venezuela's economy. Last but not least, following the example set by his close ally, the dictator Maduro, President Petro is undermining the Colombian oil company ECOPETROL. Like Maduro, he has appointed his most loyal supporters to key positions, allowing them to profit from the company's resources.

Trafficking of human beings

Human trafficking is the illegal trade of people for forced labor, sexual exploitation, or other abuses. It involves the recruitment, transportation, or harboring of individuals through force, fraud, or coercion. Victims are manipulated, deprived of their rights, and trapped in their circumstances, impacting millions globally. A "country of transit" is a stopover for trafficked individuals on their way to another destination. Though not the destination, these countries play a key role in the trafficking route, where victims are moved under various conditions—often without their consent.

President Petro has tasked Vice President Márquez with visiting several African countries to negotiate agreements for visa-free entry into Colombia⁷⁹. While this initiative aims to strengthen diplomatic ties, it has also raised concerns about potential human trafficking, as it could position Colombia as a major transit hub for traffickers⁸⁰. Many flights from Africa arrive in Colombia⁸¹, where individuals often attempt to continue their journey to the United States. A common and dangerous route involves crossing the Darién Gap, a treacherous stretch of jungle between Colombia and Panama known for its dangers, including exploitation by criminal networks.

With this decision, President Petro and Vice President Márquez are contributing to a disturbing resurgence of human trafficking in Colombia and the region, a phenomenon not seen at this level since 2015⁸². Moreover, they are carelessly empowering traffickers by officially creating a new and lucrative market for the exploitation of human beings.

International relations

Colombia's diplomacy is based on respect for international law, rejection of coercive measures, and commitment to international cooperation. Democracy is the only way to protect the rights of the weak, promote peace, uphold the rule of law, and encourage peaceful conflict resolution⁸³.

President Petro has strayed from these diplomatic values by supporting his close ally and best amigo, dictator Maduro, as well as Hezbollah and Iran's backing of Hamas. This support

encompasses Hamas's actions in Gaza, Putin's invasion of Ukraine, and the influence of organized crime in Colombia and its surroundings, particularly in relation to the Total Peace Talks.

Venezuela The government has intensified efforts to suppress peaceful opposition, leading to a severe human rights crisis marked by systematic violations, including politically motivated persecution and extrajudicial executions aimed at silencing dissent against President Nicolás Maduro's regime. The erosion of judicial independence and increased state repression of critical voices have become commonplace.

From December 2023 to March 2024, at least 48 individuals, including military personnel, human rights defenders, and journalists, were detained on alleged conspiracy charges. In July alone, over 120 arrests occurred during opposition events, with subsequent protests leading to more than 2,000 detentions, including children, accused of terrorism and incitement.

A troubling rise in extrajudicial executions, with state security forces implicated in unlawful killings of suspected opponents, highlights the regime's brutality. Due process violations are rampant, and the justice system primarily serves the government's repressive agenda. Experts report a pervasive climate of fear targeting critics, alongside increased harassment of civil society actors. As of 2024, at least 9 million Venezuelans have fled the country, underscoring the ongoing crisis.

Besides, Venezuela has become a haven⁸⁴ for criminal organizations such as the ELN, Clan del Golfo, the Disidencias Estado Mayor Central (former FARC), Segunda Marquetalia (former FARC), and Hezbollah (an ally of Hamas), all of which are involved in President Petro's Total Peace talks. Dictator Maduro, like Hugo Chávez, has claimed for years that they financed Petro's political career. This may help explain the five state visits made by the Colombian President to Venezuela and his commitment to supporting its economy through the purchase of oil and gas⁸⁵.

Iran Iranian authorities have violently suppressed the "woman, life, freedom" protests ignited by Mahsa Jina Amini's death in police custody in September 2022. Hundreds have been killed and thousands arrested, including many activists facing vague national security charges. Excessive force, torture, and sexual assault by security forces are rampant, with little accountability. Iran is a leading executor, with over 700 executions from January to November 2023, often for ambiguous protest-related offenses. Human rights abuses, including unfair trials and lack of legal representation, are widespread. Freedoms of assembly and expression are severely restricted, targeting activists, journalists, and students, while artists supporting the protests face arrests and harsh sentences, including death penalties for dissent.

Women experience systemic discrimination, with laws restricting their rights in marriage, travel, and inheritance. Reports of femicide are rising, and legal protections against domestic violence are inadequate. Enforcement of compulsory hijab laws has intensified, with new penalties proposed. Minorities, including Baha'is and ethnic groups, face discrimination and persecution, particularly in Kurdish regions, especially around the anniversary of Amini's death. Iran also supports Hezbollah and Hamas through financial aid, military training, and weapon supplies.

Hezbollah (Lebanon) Financial Support: Iran provides significant funding to Hezbollah, which helps the group maintain its operations and social services in Lebanon. **Military Training and Equipment:** Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units train Hezbollah fighters and supply advanced weaponry, including missiles and drones. **Political Support:** Iran backs Hezbollah politically, reinforcing its position within Lebanese politics and promoting its agenda against Israel and Western influences.

Hamas (Gaza Strip) Financial Aid: Iran has historically funded Hamas, particularly during conflicts with Israel, to help them rebuild and sustain their military capabilities. **Weapons and Training:** Like Hezbollah, Hamas receives military training and weapons from Iran, including rockets and other military technology. **Ideological Support:** Iran positions itself as a leader of the resistance against Israel, fostering an ideological bond with Hamas.

Venezuela Political Alliances: Iran and Venezuela have developed a strategic partnership, sharing anti-U.S. sentiments. This includes political backing and cooperation on issues of mutual interest. **Support for Militant Groups:** Through its ties with Venezuela, Iran can extend its influence and support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, leveraging Caracas as a base for operations in Latin America.

Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas is multifaceted, involving financial, military, and ideological dimensions, and extends its influence into regions like Venezuela to further its geopolitical goals. However, Iran's involvement in Colombia is more indirect but still relevant to its broader strategy in the region. While not as prominent as its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran's relationship with certain groups in Colombia has implications for regional stability.

Colombia Support for Armed Groups: Iran has been linked to supporting leftist guerrilla groups, like the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN. This support often includes providing training and possibly arms, which helps these groups in their struggles against the Colombian government and U.S. influence in the region. **Drug Trafficking Connections:** Some reports suggest that Iranian entities may engage in drug trafficking networks in Colombia, which can serve to finance their operations and strengthen ties with local insurgent groups. **Political Alliances:** Iran has sought to forge alliances with countries in Latin America, including Colombia, that share anti-U.S. sentiments. This helps Iran expand its influence and creates opportunities for collaboration against shared adversaries.

Russia During his opposition to the government, President Petro repeatedly echoed the propaganda orchestrated by Russia (a key China ally) via Venezuela regarding the coronavirus pandemic. He organized protests with his political party, Colombia Humana, alongside two significant allies, Polo Democrático and Alianza Verde denying the pandemic. At the end of 2018, they moved their communication center to Caracas, from where, with the help of Russia and Venezuela, they inundated Colombia and the region with fake news. This alliance was crucial for the opposition during the 2018-2022 period, enabling them to organize protests and spread propaganda in Colombia.

The *Venezuela-Russia bot army* refers to the coordinated use of social media bots and disinformation campaigns that have been linked to the Venezuelan government and Russian actors. This strategy has had a notable impact on Colombia and the broader region in several ways: **Disinformation Campaigns:** These bot networks often spread false narratives about political events in Colombia, aiming to destabilize the political landscape and undermine trust in democratic institutions. They may amplify divisive content or misinformation regarding issues like elections, protests, or governance. **Influencing Public Opinion:** By flooding social media platforms with specific messages, these bots can shape public opinion, sway political debates, and create a perception of a more polarized environment. This can exacerbate existing tensions in Colombian society. **Support for Political Allies:** The Venezuelan government has historically supported leftist movements in Colombia. The bot army can amplify support for these groups, contributing to their visibility and influence, while also discrediting opposition parties. **Regional Destabilization:** The activities of these bots can have ripple effects throughout Latin America, promoting instability in neighboring countries. By influencing perceptions and politics in Colombia, they can contribute to a broader pattern of unrest or conflict in the region. **Cyber Warfare and Hybrid Tactics:** This use of technology is part of a broader strategy of hybrid

warfare, where non-military means are employed to achieve political goals. This tactic can make it difficult for traditional governments to respond effectively, as it blurs the lines between warfare and information manipulation.

The *Venezuela-Russia bot army* has played a significant role in shaping the political discourse in Colombia to help Gustavo Petro and its allies, and the surrounding region, using disinformation to influence public perception and support political agendas that align with their interests. Therefore, it is in Colombia where President Putin has one of his most loyal proxies with Colombian President Petro. Colombian diplomacy under President Petro has taken on what he describes as an innovative approach; however, this innovation is marked by aggression, lies and violence. Although his focus on critical issues seeks to capture international attention, the use of harsh rhetoric and support for terrorism—both domestically and internationally—undermines the diplomatic values that Colombia has upheld for the past 200 years.

International Aid

In this context, international aid has primarily been redirected to President Petro's key *revisionist* policies. Millions of dollars have been allocated to produce films, documentaries, books, conferences, seminars, and monuments aimed at rewriting history and promoting narratives of hate and violence. By the standards of this government, kidnappers, rapists, murderers, and drug dealers have been elevated to the status of national heroes. Respectable universities collaborate with the Ministry of Culture⁸⁶ and other national institutions, such as the National Center for Historical Memory⁸⁷, to produce this material.

Ministries and institutions show little restraint in using public funds (most of which come from international aid) to create myths about President Petro's life⁸⁸, policies, and impact. In addition, numerous books inaccurately portray various neighborhoods in cities such as Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín as strongholds of right-wing paramilitaries. This uncritical support from the international community underscores its *complicity* in perpetuating corruption, violence, and hatred. Alarming, embassies often return to their home countries with misleading information about the true distribution of these funds. Parliamentary foreign affairs committees in these countries sometimes conduct closed-door investigations, but ultimately little or no action is taken.

Conclusions

Colombia is facing a resurgence of violence, with organized crime now controlling about 65% of the country. This has led to widespread insecurity and increased political violence, further destabilizing the nation. President Petro proclaimed Colombia a "world power of life," but in practice, he has turned it into a global hub for drug trafficking. At this rate, it seems he is on the verge of transforming Colombia into a world power of corruption as well.

Over 8 million Colombians have been forcibly displaced, highlighting a significant national security failure that demands urgent intervention. Under President Petro's administration, the economic situation is deteriorating, marked by rising inflation and high unemployment. Ambiguous economic policies have created uncertainty for businesses and households alike.

Additionally, a human rights crisis is emerging, with extensive violations against activists and marginalized communities, underscoring the need for urgent protective measures. Geopolitical risks from alliances between Colombian criminal organizations and foreign entities complicate governance and international relations.

Recommendations

To tackle these issues, the Colombian government must strengthen national security, focusing on combating organized crime while protecting displaced populations, potentially with

international support. Promoting dialogue and political unity is essential; initiatives that foster political discourse can help reduce polarization and enhance social cohesion.

A re-evaluation of the Total Peace Policy is needed to prevent it from inadvertently empowering organized crime. Increased international engagement is crucial for both the Colombian government and the global community, as a proactive approach can bolster democratic institutions and address human rights violations effectively. Finally, ensuring transparency and accountability is vital. Establishing independent monitoring of human rights violations and promoting media freedom will combat information suppression and restore public confidence in governance.

Bogotá, Colombia, December 12th, 2024

Notes

1. The national government, the ruling party, UN, EU, and numerous Colombian and international NGOs deny the reality of widespread violence and organized crime controlling much of the country.
 2. <https://www.defensoria.gov.co/-/la-expansi%C3%B3n-y-consolidaci%C3%B3n-de-los-grupos-armados-ilegales-son-la-principal-amenaza-para-el-pa%C3%ADs> <https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/44d9a7623f0746f4aa7bfde0e7eff71c> ; <https://es.mongabay.com/2023/10/violencia-en-amazonia-de-colombia-guardaparques-desplazados-areas-protegidas-disputadas-por-grupos-armados-ilegales/> ; <https://www.pares.com.co/post/cap%C3%ADtulo-i-i-presencia-y-accionar-de-grupos-armados-en-colombia-2024> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djsHhHnPMKQ> ; <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/informe-mapp-oea-2023-asi-va-la-paz-total-grupos-armados-se-expandieron-acuerdo-de-paz-farc/>
 3. <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/los-grupos-armados-continuaron-fortaleci%C3%A9ndose-durante-el-gobierno-de-petro-seg%C3%BAAn-informe/48754198> <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/10/16/a-traves-de-la-paz-total-se-estarian-financiando-grupos-terroristas-firma-de-abogados-hace-grave-denuncia-ante-la-onu/>
 4. <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/las-cifras-que-presenta-informe-global-sobre-desplazamiento-2024/> ; <https://codhes.org/2024/04/24/poblacion-desplazada-sigue-siendo-la-mas-vulnerable-entre-las-vulnerables-del-pais-indica-la-iv-encuesta-nacional-sobre-situacion-de-poblacion-desplazada-en-colombia/>
 5. Since taking office, President Petro has been dismantling the armed forces, redefining their roles and altering defense policy, while also urging them to refrain from using force. On November 4, 2024, he signed a resolution disbanding the units specifically created to combat organized crime. <https://www.bluradio.com/nacion/juan-carlos-pinzon-con-fin-de-comandos-conjuntos-tapan-a-un-lado-pero-se-descubrio-otro-pr30> <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/esta-decision-sin-duda-genera-preocupacion-reconocio-excomandante-ff-mm-por-supresion-de-los-comandos-conjuntos-y-fuerzas-de-tarea-conjuntas-3396646>
 6. “Net emigration of Colombian nationals reached a record level in 2022, with more than 547 thousand emigrants,” highlighted a report published by the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC); <https://anato.org/noticias/en-un-5-crecio-el-flujo-de-colombianos-hacia-el-exterior-en-2023/#:~:text=Viajes%20y%20Turismo-.En%20un%205%25%20creci%C3%B3n%20el%20flujo%20de,hacia%20el%20exterior%20en%202023&text=%E2%80%93%20El%20a%C3%B3n%20pasado%20%205.174..,2022%20fueron%204.930.739> ; <https://www.iom.int/es/news/segun-el-perfil-migratorio-de-la-oim-mas-de-tres-millones-de-colombianos-residen-en-el-extranjero> Citing OCHA, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights said that Afro-descendant people made up 37% of all confinement victims in 2023 and Indigenous Peoples represented 25%.
 7. Colombia is facing a severe and complex crisis. This document focuses on only a few of the key issues.
 8. Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro have always said they financed Gustavo Petro’s political career: <https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2021/10/19/regimen-venezolano-patrocin-a-gustavo-petro-las-explosivas-declaraciones-de-hugo-el-pollo-carvajal/> ; <https://colombiacheck.com/cheques/declaracion-de-pollo-carvajal-sobre-financiacion-del-gobierno-de-venezuela-petro-no-es> <https://panampost.com/felipe-fernandez/2018/03/21/maduro-gustavo-petro/> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RYQjeJAHpZg> <https://okdiario.com/internacional/elogios-petro-chavez-hombre-inmenso-que-logro-disminuir-pobreza-como-ningun-otro-9261812>
 9. President Gustavo Petro repeat Maduro’s hate speeches in Colombia changing only names.
- ### An oppressive regime
10. <https://www.portafolio.co/tendencias/estudio-revela-como-le-fue-al-presidente-petro-en-su-cuenta-de-twitter-en-primer-ano-de-gobierno-586825> <https://voz.us/es/mundo/240501/9561/luego-de-meses-de-ataques-y-mentiras-antisemitas-gustavo-petro-rompe-las-relaciones-de-colombia-con-israel.html> <https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/el-presidente-x-diplomacia-tuitera-de-petro-debilta-su-voz-ante-el-mundo/>
 11. In a systematic and organized manner, the President has shown disrespect towards individuals he considers opponents or those who do not share his political views. He notably shocked the president of the Supreme Court of Colombia, who is of Afro-descendant heritage, questioning how a *Black man* could belong to the conservative party. <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/por-que-petro-cuestiono-al-presidente-de-la-corte-suprema-BH25339910>
- Similarly, he made derogatory remarks about an Afro-descendant soccer player who rode a horse with a former president, stating, “he allows himself to be treated like a slave.” Additionally, President Petro has been accused of using secret services to monitor high-ranking officials, such as judges and prosecutors. He has publicly revealed personal details, including their sexual orientation and private lives, to exert pressure on them.
12. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Adtv6Wp1pv0>
 13. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsdF86WTWL0> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Adtv6Wp1pv0>
 14. <https://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/blanquitos-ricos/202300/>
 15. Colombia’s vice president, Francia Marquez, has been presented with the W.E.B. Du Bois Medal by Harvard University. The Colombian politician is the first Latin American leader to receive this award, which is given to leaders in recognition of their contributions to African and Afro-American culture; <https://www.semana.com/semana-tv/el-control/articulo/blanquitos-ricos-el-control-a-gustavo-petro-y-su-defensa-a-francia-marquez/202357/>
 16. <https://unipd-centrodirittumani.it/en/schede/Hate-Speech-in-the-Context-of-Armed-Conflicts/519> <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15731.doc.htm>
 17. <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/10/09/petro-arremete-contramagistrados-del-cne-por-formulacion-de-cargos-contrasucampaña-lorduy-ha-sido-vinculado-al-asesinato-de-una-novia-que-tenia/> <https://www.agenciapi.co/noticia/politica/presidente-gustavo-petro-arremete-contrala-corte-suprema-por-allanamiento-fecode>
 18. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCWrt2gt7Y>
 19. <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/05/08/que-piensen-los-colombianos-de-los-balconazos-de-petro/>
 20. Contested by his own family (his elder son, President’s brothers, and close friends and his right-hand collaborator in relation with money coming from the organized crime into his presidential campaign. And the National Electoral Council in relation with the amounts of money that entered his presidential campaign.
 21. <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/petro-arremete-contrala-prensa-acusaciones-sin-pruebas-y-llama-a-una-constituyente-DC25415767>

22. His speeches are filled with hostility and violence towards white individuals, Afro-descendants who disagree with his ideology, and women, particularly female journalists: <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2023-05-09/del-balconazo-a-la-pelea-permanente-con-los-medios.html>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u64WqD3TLQU>
 23. <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/07/24/abogados-dieron-jalon-de-orejas-a-gustavo-petro-debe-proteger-la-independencia-de-poderes/>
 24. <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-08-11/dos-anos-de-desencanto.html> The more the Petro Government advances without results, the more the President is becoming rude and extremist in the way he behaves and speaks.
 25. Since he took office, and systematically, whenever his supporters and proxies commit crimes, President Petro comes out to defend them and grant them privileges: those who have committed crimes against humanity are appointed gestores de paz; if they have attacked or tried to kill one of his opponents, they become gestores de paz; if they set fire to the forests and mountains, creating desolation and attacking the environment in Colombia, gestores de paz: <https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/exclusivo-esta-es-la-lista-oficial-de-los-gestores-de-paz-designados-por-petro-15-peligrosos-criminales-lograron-salir-de-la-carcel/202407/> ; <https://elfrente.com.co/peligrosos-bandidos-han-sido-nombrados-gestores-de-paz-por-gobierno-de-gustavo-petro/>
 26. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CkISfvM4cDI>
 27. With the support of Total Peace partner's, the government has imposed new directors in various public universities in Colombia; <https://razonpublica.com/grupos-armados-gobierno-paro-nacional-la-lucha-los-jovenes/>
 28. President Petro says he was a member of the M-19. When reminded of his wrongdoing during that period, he even denies having been in their ranks.
 29. Although the M-19 was an urban guerrilla group that operated essentially in Bogotá and other major cities in the country, it was in Caquetá that its military structure was born. The President of Colombia has said that the President of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, was part of the M-19, which she did not deny.
 30. <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/los-nexos-entre-el-presidente-petro-y-el-colectivo-que-incito-asedio-a-la-corte-suprema-AH23712020>
 31. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTnE2byeX9s>; <https://elfrente.com.co/peligrosos-bandidos-han-sido-nombrados-gestores-de-paz-por-gobierno-de-gustavo-petro/>; <https://www.portafolio.co/economia/gobierno/petro-pide-exhibir-la-bandera-de-la-guerrilla-del-m-19-en-un-acto-publico-603688>
 32. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTnE2byeX9s>
 33. Amnesty is a legal pardon from a government that exempts individuals or groups from prosecution for specific offenses, often related to political crimes. It can facilitate peace processes and promote reconciliation in post-conflict situations.
 34. <https://www.lasillavacia.com/en-vivo/en-ceremonia-militar-petro-condecora-a-policias-y-ex-miembros-del-m-19/>
 35. With government money and support.
 36. <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-02-08/la-protesta-contr-la-corte-suprema-aumenta-la-tension-entre-los-magistrados-y-el-ejecutivo.html>
 37. As for example, the National Council Election (Consejo Nacional Electoral).
 38. <https://www.ohchr.org/es/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-basic-principles-justice-victims-crime-and-abuse>
- Total Peace**
39. The Total Peace policy allows the government to negotiate with armed and criminal groups. Total Peace is the peace policy designed and currently (2022-2026) being implemented by the government of Gustavo Petro. This law modifies the Public Law order and allows for the government to negotiate with armed and criminal groups using different strategies and legal tools.
 40. <https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/el-crimen-organizado-y-el-conflicto-armado-interno-nos-desbordaron-hace-tiempo-3386727>; <https://www.bluradio.com/nacion/todos-los-grupos-armados-se-han-fortalecido-con-los-cese-al-fuego-segun-inteligencia-rg10>
 41. Before President Petro arrived in power such illegal groups controlled 141 municipalities out of 1119.
 42. This assertion arises from observations between 2018 and 2022, during which the opposition and the current government's allies in the Total Peace initiative allegedly collaborated to undermine the previous administration. Two key points stand out: First, the ELN (National Liberation Army) launched a brutal attack on the General Santander police academy in Bogotá on January 17, 2019, killing 22 cadets. The ELN has since become a strategic ally of the current government, reportedly maintaining ties with Nicolás Maduro and Hezbollah. Second, the 2021 social protests, supported by the current president during his opposition, reportedly received millions in funding and involved extensive paramilitary logistics. While the exact sources of this funding remain unclear, the ELN and other criminal groups are believed to have played significant roles.
 43. The president's eldest son, his ex-wife, the former chief of staff, and Colombia's ambassador to the FAO—a close friend of the president—have openly discussed the substantial drug money that financed the campaign of the then-presidential candidate. Additionally, one of the president's brothers confirmed in a television interview that negotiations occurred during the campaign with current Total Peace partners linked to organized crime: <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/09/04/hermano-de-gustavo-petro-confeso-que-ganaron-las-elecciones-con-votos-promovidos-desde-las-carceles-obtuvo-un-millon-y-pico-que-no-tenia-antes/>
 44. According to Human Rights Watch, President Gustavo Petro's "total peace" strategy has had limited success in reducing violence against civilians in Colombia: Human rights defenders: Between January and November 2023, Human Rights Watch documented 150 killings of human rights defenders and social leaders. The Constitutional Court ordered the government to take action to protect human rights defenders, but the court found that the government's actions were insufficient. Police misconduct: Human Rights Watch has documented police misconduct in response to peaceful protests, including killings, injuries, and arbitrary arrests. Armed groups: Despite the 2016 peace accord, armed groups continue to commit abuses in remote areas. Femicide: Femicide remains a concern, and perpetrators are rarely brought to justice. Violence against LGBTI people: Violence against LGBTI people remains a concern. Barriers to access: Barriers remain for Venezuelans seeking international protection. Access to safe drinking water: 96% of families in rural areas do not have access to safe drinking water. Migrants: A lack of safe pathways is pushing more migrants to cross the Darién Gap.
 45. It means that at least 600 municipalities in Colombia are under the control of criminal groups.
 46. <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/cuales-son-los-grupos-armados-del-pais-y-como-estan-organizados-eln-y-clan-del-golfo-JK21184195> While the exact number remains unclear, it is evident that the number of militants has risen, especially among minors who have been forcibly recruited across the country.
 47. Drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnappings, and the recruitment of children are rampant issues that foster a climate of fear. These activities are often conducted in partnership with the national government as part of the Total Peace negotiations.

48. This is a serious concern, as Nicolás Maduro—often referenced by the Colombian president—remains in power through ties with Venezuelan and international organized crime, including Hezbollah, ELN, and former FARC members. This troubling alliance has deepened since President Hugo Chávez's time, when the regime actively invited these groups into Venezuela.

49. <https://elpais.com/americas-colombia/2024-09-18/petro-vuelve-a-subir-el-sono-contra-las-cortes.html>

50. The National Strike of 2021, organized by the opposition led by Gustavo Petro, along with allies including the Maduro government and the ELN, was described as a social explosion: <https://www.elcolombiano.com/opinion/columnistas/rafael-nieto-loaiza-las-amenazas-de-petro-PE24465381>

51. Transnational organized crime from Venezuela and Colombia has spread to Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina, fueling crime and instigating panic and violence. More critically, these networks undermine democracy, as seen in their support for leaders like Nicolás Maduro and Gustavo Petro: <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/07/16/organizaciones-criminales-integradas-por-colombianos-y-venezolanos-siembran-panico-en-chile/> <https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/asesinan-a-otro-lider-politico-en-ecuador-pedro-briones-recibio-impacto-de-bala-796102> <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articulos/c3gx531ezgjo>

52. El tren de Aragua is present in Colombia with the support of the today's Total Peace partners of President Petro.

53. Additionally, President Petro's allies have secured key positions at the national level, aligned with Colombia's constitutional framework. These positions are within independent institutions meant to uphold checks and balances, such as the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Ombudsperson's Office, among others. However, during their time in opposition, President Petro and his allies vigorously criticized this practice, gaining support from the international community, including the United Nations, the European Union, and Transparency International. Now, they appear to have reversed their position, asserting that this practice is acceptable.

Cocaine crops

54. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC. Global Report on Cocaine 2023, Local dynamics, global challenges.

55. President Petro is using Salvatore Mancuso (a former leader of a far-right paramilitary) as a key figure in the Total Peace Talks to pressure former President Uribe by accusing him of paramilitary activities. Mancuso has become a prominent figure under Petro's government for this reason: <https://www.pares.com.co/post/por-qu%C3%A9-petro-escogi%C3%B3-como-gestor-de-paz-a-un-asesino-como-salvatore-mancuso>; <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/salvatore-mancuso-el-despiadado-senor-de-la-guerra-que-expandio-el-terror-paramilitar-por-el-pais-3361863> However, when Iván Mordisco, another criminal as Mancuso, claims that he and his criminal organization supported Petro's presidential campaign (<https://www.lasillavacia.com/en-vivo/ivan-mordisco-asegura-que-el-emc-apoyo-a-petro-en-campana/>) President Petro vehemently denied it. This raises a key issue: on one hand, everything Mancuso said about the former president is accepted as true by the national government, while on the other hand, Mordisco's statement about President Petro is dismissed as a lie.

Massacres

56. Caracol Radio and TV.

57. <https://indepaz.org.co/informe-de-masacres-en-colombia-durante-el-2020-2021/comment-page-4/>

58. Colombia, OHCHR (A/HRC/55/23) in report 2024 to the HRC: Non-state armed groups and criminal organizations continue to expand their control over lands and communities, with serious impacts on human rights. High levels of violence are disproportionately affecting rural communities, Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, and their leaders. Last year, my Office verified 105 killings of human rights defenders and 98 massacres, in which 320 people were killed. We also verified 53 cases of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, and 134 cases of recruitment or use of children by non-state armed actors. Such levels of violence require increased civilian protection efforts by the Government.

59. As for example, Maduro bot army which works for President Petro.

60. The Venezuela-Russia bot army is reportedly working on behalf of President Gustavo Petro. However, the exact amount the Colombian government is paying for these services remains unclear.

61. It's important to note that Global Witness lacks access to accurate information regarding approximately 65% of the territory controlled by President Petro's allies in the Total Peace negotiations.

62. <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/colombia-es-el-pais-mas-lethal-para-los-lideres-ambientales-con-el-40-del-total-de-los-homicidios-conocidos-en-2023-3394166>

63. According to research by Constella Intelligence, a Spanish data analytics company: In the weeks following the emergence of the socio-political crises, Constella analysts identified a small number of accounts that generated a large volume of publications related to the street protests in Colombia: 1% of the analyzed users generated 33% of the analyzed results. These high activity profiles flood the digital public debate with their comments and content and are considered statistically anomalous given the frequency of their activity over the period analyzed. This is a key indicator of information disorder... Constella's analysis identified a total of 175 identities that actively participated in both crises. When examining the public geolocation provided by these users or profiles, 58% of those who publicly shared their geolocation were geolocated in Venezuela: Constella Intelligence, "Protests in South America: An Analysis of New Trends in Digital Disinformation and Influence Campaigns," Constella Intelligence, February 13, 2020.

64. Since 2018, Gustavo Petro and his political allies have been meeting and collaborating with various criminal and terrorist groups. Evidence of this collaboration was present during the 2021 social protests, in which left and far-left paramilitaries such as the ELN, former FARC's, and far-right paramilitaries supported the uprising by providing money and logistics, and later supported Petro's presidential campaign, as stated by the presidential family and shown on national television. In addition, as mentioned above, Ivan Mordisco, a dangerous kingpin, confirmed it to Colombia through the radio news.

65. Ministry of Information Technology and Communications of Colombia.

66. <https://www.portafolio.co/economia/gobierno/fiscalia-confirma-compra-del-software-espia-pegasus-por-11-millones-de-dolares-616298>

67. <https://x.com/ojocolombia2026/status/1849047374708023606?t=vLQL4kzD13QXv2-kmxM21A&s=08>

68. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELybZF3D_IQ

69. See presentations in Acciones internacionales del Estado Colombiano frente al COVID-19, 2020-2021, 353 p., F. de Mora/D. Medina, Ministry of Foreign affairs of Colombia: <https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/FOTOS2020/01-08-2022%20Acciones%20Internacionales%20del%20Estado%20Colombiano%20frente%20a%20COVID-19%20%202020-2021.pdf>

<https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/09/04/hermano-de-gustavo-petro-confeso-que-ganaron-las-elecciones-con-votos-promovidos-desde-las-carceles-obtuvo-un-millon-y-pico-que-no-tenia-antes/>; <https://www.eltiempo.com/unidad-investigativa/gustavo-petro-los-condenados-que-visitaba-su-hermano-en-la-picota-755694>; <https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-y-derechos-humanos/danilo-rueda-comisionado-de-paz-de-petro-CO18164600>; <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/09/05/carlos-fernando-galan-cuestiona-si>

existio-el-pacto-de-la-picota-por-declaraciones-de-juan-fernando-petro-sobre-la-campana/ <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-oscuro-prontuario-del-empresario-venezolano-visitado-por-piedad-cordoba-en-la-picota/202208/>
70. <https://www.eltiempo.com/salud/de-que-operaron-al-senador-gustavo-petro-en-cuba-483842>;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWmt7VdTp74>
71. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/the-reinforcing-activities-of-the-el-nacional-liberation-army-in-colombia-and-venezuela/>;
<https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/el-n-in-venezuela/>
72. <https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/09/29/el-dictador-nicolas-maduro-expreso-su-solidaridad-al-grupo-terrorista-hezbollah-por-la-muerte-de-hassan-nasrallah/> <https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/cual-es-la-presencia-que-tiene-hezbollah-en-venezuela-542747>

A strangled economy

73. <https://www.portafolio.co/economia/crecimiento/asi-perciben-los-colombianos-la-situacion-economica-del-pais-617091>
74. <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/08/06/cifras-del-gobierno-petro-confirman-por-que-la-situacion-economica-actual-de-los-colombianos-esta-peor-que-en-pandemia/>; <https://www.larepublica.co/globoeconomia/colombia-de-19-entre-38-con-el-mayor-porcentaje-de-deuda-como-equivalente-del-pib-3818979/>; <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/06/18/colombia-esta-cerca-de-quedarse-sin-dolares-y-no-pagar-la-deuda-externa-por-lentitud-en-tramite-en-el-congreso/>; <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-02-06/el-peso-de-la-deuda-y-un-crecimiento-residual-agobian-a-la-economia-colombiana.html>
75. <https://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/colombia-crece-menos-que-la-region-mas-lenta-del-planeta-que-sugiere-hacer-el-vicepresidente-del-banco-mundial-3394210>
76. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=taGvg0sKWL0>
77. <https://www.larepublica.co/economia/estatal-ecopetrol-anuncia-nuevo-hallazgo-de-petroleo-y-gas-en-la-cuenca-del-putumayo-3676048>
<https://forbes.co/2024/03/01/negocios/ricardo-roa-presidente-de-ecopetrol-habla-resultados-ingresos-utilidades-2023>
78. https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2023/12/13/la-colombie-premier-grand-pays-a-rejoindre-la-coalition-de-non-proliferation-des-energies-fossiles_6205589_3244.html

Trafficking of human beings

79. <https://colombia.as.com/actualidad/vicepresidenta-francia-marquez-viaja-a-africa-a-que-paises-llegara-n/>
80. <https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/12/20/crisis-migratoria-cuales-son-los-paises-africanos-que-pueden-ingresar-a-colombia-sin-visa/>
81. <https://www.rcnradio.com/bogota/video-crisis-migratoria-en-el-dorado-decenas-de-africanos-duermen-en-el-aeropuerto>
<https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/ninos-extranjeros-abandonados-en-aeropuerto-el-dorado-ubican-a-sus-familias-837096>
<https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/12/20/no-son-solo-los-dos-ninos-habria-al-menos-setenta-africanos-atrapados-en-el-aeropuerto-el-dorado/> <https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/migrantes-africanos-utilizan-colombia-en-transito-a%C3%A9reo-hacia-el-salvador-para-evitar-el-darien/7408785.html> <https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2023-12-21/la-cancilleria-colombiana-niega-que-haya-una-crisis-migratoria-en-el-aeropuerto-de-bogota.html>
82. <https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/analisis/ola-trafico-humano-llega-colombia/>

International relations

83. Presentación, in Colombia y la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, 1946-2022, 362 p. F. de Mora / D. Medina, Ministry of Foreign affairs of Colombia:
<https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/FOTOS2020/Colombia%20en%20la%20Asamblea%20General%20de%20las%20Naciones%20Unidas%201946%20-%202021.pdf>
84. Venezuela under Maduro and Colombia under Petro are in a fierce contest for such a haven for criminal organizations.
85. <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/el-historial-de-encuentros-bilaterales-entre-gustavo-petro-y-nicolas-maduro-3332074>

International Aid

86. <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/robo-de-espada-de-bolivar-critican-a-mincultura-por-evento-conmemorativo-845271>
<https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/01/17/andres-forero-critica-que-mincultura-hable-del-robo-de-la-espada-de-bolivar-como-una-recuperacion/>
87. <https://www.kienyke.com/radar-k/pelicula-de-matarife-sera-proyectada-con-aval-del-centro-nacional-de-memoria-historica>
<https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/presentan-queja-contra-directora-del-centro-de-memoria-por-divulgacion-de-la-pelicula>
88. To say that in school he was a brilliant student. He was good but not excellent; that he holds a PhD, not; that he was a Colombian ambassador, not; that he was good university student, he was not; that he holds masters, not, and son on
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7B_6oZF8_DM As a member of the M-19, Petro had to keep an eye on the prisoners. He defecated in their food, which is why he is known as “el cacas” (the pooper). However, he has made up stories that have nothing to do with reality
<https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/06/19/gustavo-petro-guerrillero-m-19-historia-orix-2> <https://www.lasillavacia.com/detector-de-mentiras/falso/otra-vez-petro-no-se-apodaba-el-cacas-ni-defecaba-sobre-secuestrados/>