

Colombia Abducted

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The legitimacy of the Petro-Iván Cepeda administration has been compromised by an unlikely convergence of testimonies. According to the President's closest family and various insurgent groups tied to his "Total Peace" deal, they allegedly ascended to power using the financial and logistical scaffolding of organized crime¹. Under their administration, Colombia became a leading hub for cocaine production, illegal gold mining, and other illicit economies.

These networks now exert influence over roughly 70% of the national territory and allegedly delivered 2.4 million votes to the Pacto Histórico-Petro-Cepeda coalition in the March 8, 2026, legislative elections across 126 verified municipalities². Their estimated 27,000 members operate as a nationwide political machine sustained through coercion, assassinations³, intimidation⁴, and repression targeting communities, opposition leaders, and the media.

At the same time, Colombia's police⁵ and military have been reduced to 43% of their operational strength. Since taking office, the Petro administration has steadily weakened the Colombian Army while using public resources to campaign for its party and presidential candidates, blurring constitutional and electoral boundaries.

Petro himself publicly anointed Cepeda as his successor, effectively sidelining the party consultation that nominated him and reducing it to little more than political theater. At the same time, serious concerns persist over the transparency of Cepeda's campaign financing⁶.

Over the past three weeks, Petro-Cepeda campaign has entered a more aggressive phase. Individuals linked to the movement have appeared in restaurants, cafés, shopping centers, and other public spaces to spread fear-based messaging. Rather than engage in debate, they issue warnings implying that Colombians will "see what happens" if Petro-Cepeda lose the election.

They have also been accused of paying Indigenous communities to travel the country by bus to campaign for them—frequently relying on violent tactics. Just as they did during the 2022 presidential campaign⁷, the Petro-Cepeda faction succeeded in turning Indigenous communities against one another, leading

to a tragic toll of at least six dead and more than 100 injured. Their clear objective was to divide these populations and weaponize the chaos to force political support⁸.

On 19 May, the Petro-Cepeda campaign transported and paid groups of people – mostly young participants – to gather near the residence of former President Álvaro Uribe. The mobilization was led by Hernán Muriel, recently elected by Pacto Histórico⁹. Their objective – as seen with the indigenous communities and peasants¹⁰ – is to provoke confrontation and instill fear as a tool of political pressure.

Despite constitutional and legal restrictions, President Petro continues to act as the central figure of the presidential campaign – Cepeda clearly plays a second role. Fear has become pervasive: few people speak publicly, and those who do often face violent retaliation from actors tied to the "Total Peace" structure—individuals granted peace-mediator status¹¹ that allows them freedom of movement while criminal operations continue without meaningful state intervention.

Cepeda has argued that these killings are merely consequences of war¹² and that the victims should be viewed as casualties of the conflict, including in reference to the assassination of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay¹³.

What this narrative ignores are the allegations that illegal armed groups and organized crime structures aligned with the government increasingly treat political opponents of Petro-Cepeda as legitimate targets.

Colombia is facing systematic electoral violence¹⁴ led by Petro-Cepeda presidential campaign. It is also experiencing a takeover in which actors linked to the "Total Peace" deal seek control over territory, public discourse, and the electoral system itself¹⁵.

Colombia is being held hostage while some – mostly European – international actors stay aligned with Petro and Cepeda in exchange for multi-million-dollar *irregular* contracts. At the same time, the Petro government appears to selectively share intelligence on limited cocaine shipments with allied European states to produce *political "wins"* – a pattern that echoes, in structure, tactics seen in the Pablo Escobar era¹⁶.

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¹ Petro-Cepeda called them "the people": Iván Mordisco, Iván Márquez, Cálará, Pitufu, Pipe Tulúa – <https://tribunal/0d7CJT4> El Zarko Andinever, and other FARC dissidents and traffickers have publicly claimed they backed Petro's 2022 campaign. Today, many are tied to the government's "Total Peace".

² Semana, magazine, Bogotá, Colombia, Votes from the war? April 18, 2026, pp. 38-39 printed.

³ Mr. Rogers Mauricio Devia, of the De la Esperiella presidential campaign, was killed, *El Tiempo*, 18 May 2026, p. 1.3, among other assassinations.

⁴ More than 32 municipalities face serious risks of violence, according to the Minister of Defense, *El Tiempo*, 18 May 2026, p. 1.3.

⁵ While **armed groups** attack civilians and the opposition, the police have orders not to intervene.

⁶ Colombia's National Electoral Council (CNE) opened a preliminary investigation into Iván Cepeda's primary campaign financing on April 28, 2026, over alleged irregularities tied to the 2025 Pacto Histórico consultation.

⁷ In early 2022, the Arhuaco community faced unprecedented internal fractures as the controversial registration of Governor Zarzawiko Torres sparked physical altercations and an intervention by the Constitutional Court. National media outlets revealed that state entities and Petro political campaign exploited these leadership divisions. The crisis peaked just days before the presidential runoff, culminating in a massive, disputed assembly in Nabusimake that deeply divided the 60 Arhuaco settlements for political gain.

⁸ On May 21, 2026, violent clashes between the Misak and Nasa Indigenous communities in Silvia, Cauca, left six people dead and over 100 injured. According to Colombian national media and local authorities, the deadly confrontation stemmed from a severe escalation of a long-standing, historical territorial dispute over ancestral land rights in the region. *El Tiempo*, *Noticias Caracol*, and *Radio Nacional de Colombia*.

⁹ Almost all the Colombian media reported the incident.

¹⁰ Twelve buses and eight "chivas" (traditional rustic buses) carrying protesters entered Bogotá for the National Agrarian March in the Plaza de Bolívar, *El Tiempo*, 20 May 2026.

¹¹ Petro offers these *indulgences* in return for political and logistical backing.

¹² Between January and May 19, 56 massacres (229 victims) took place in Colombia, *El Tiempo*, 20 May 2026.

¹³ Iván Cepeda: "The assassination of Miguel Uribe Turbay was a war crime." The interview circulated between March 21-25, 2026 in political commentary and media discussion linked to *Elu Radio* and *Caracol Radio*, later spreading across broader media ecosystems including *Reddit* and *EL PAÍS América Colombia*.

Opponents argued the wording reframed the assassination through the lens of armed conflict rather than political terrorism, and some critics *alleged* that allies of the Petro-Cepeda political camp engaged in coordinated messaging efforts to downplay or reframe the controversy in public debate.

¹⁴ Security amid a surge in violence, *El Espectador*, 18 May 2026, p. 5.

¹⁵ The EU Electoral Observation Mission found several campaigns attacking the Colombia Electoral System, *El Espectador*, 18 May 2026, p. 4. Petro-Cepeda presidential campaign led such attacks in social media.

¹⁶ In May 2026, Spanish authorities seized a cargo ship carrying about 30 tons of cocaine near the Canary Islands, arrested 23 crew members, and brought the vessel to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. A Spanish court sealed the case under "secret sumario" to protect the investigation. The Canary Islands are a key Atlantic route for cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe.