

Colombia #1

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For the third consecutive year, Colombia remains, *by far*, the *world's leading producer and exporter of cocaine* (UNODC 2025 report). This is the most consequential outcome of President Petro's 42 months in office.

That record isn't his alone—it reflects the criminal networks that thrived under his “peace” strategy. In 2022, Petro's “Total Peace” plan granted illegal groups political legitimacy and legal perks yet delivered no real security for Colombians. The only beneficiaries are Petro and his allies.

Critics point to the so-called “La Picota Jail Pact,” likely renewed on 4 September 2025, as a stark example: an agreement granting criminal leaders' *operational freedom, territorial control, and legal leniency* in exchange for political backing and the *pretense* of participating in peace talks.

The results, they contend, are blunt. Beyond consolidating its position as the world's top cocaine producer, Colombia has seen illegal armed groups and organized crime *expand dramatically*—now estimated at more than 27,000 members nationwide. The Gulf Clan alone has increased 140% to reach 9,600 men (IDEAS PARA LA PAZ 2026 report).

These criminal organizations are said to exert *influence* over roughly 70% of the national territory and about 65% of municipalities. *Violence has surged*, with more than 40,000 of Colombians killed during Petro's tenure. Among the most shocking episodes was the *assassination* of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay.

Critics warn that Colombia faces a growing *convergence* between criminal networks and political processes, raising concerns about the integrity of its democratic institutions. They allege that criminal groups have been *actively* supporting candidates aligned with President Petro in legislative and presidential elections.

In Tumaco, Nariño—where Iván Cepeda launched his presidential campaign in October 2025. At a meeting he organized on February 23, FARC dissidents were present; in other regions, they openly call on voters to support Petro's allies. Yet despite these realities, international election observation missions continue to offer reassurance and affirm the integrity of the electoral process (EL TIEMPO, 03.03.2026, p. 1.4).

The contrast is stark: as criminal actors signal political alignment on the ground, the official narrative insists on normalcy—an inconsistency that demands scrutiny, not complacency.

Nariño's border with Ecuador, vast coca crops, and Pacific access make it a key hub for trafficking and transnational crime. In Tumaco, these FARC dissidents not only control drug routes but also *exercise* power through extortion, forced recruitment, and informal *political and social authority*, consolidating their control in the region.

Across Colombia, *the humanitarian and human rights consequences* have been *severe and unmistakable*. In its 2025 report, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documents a clear *deterioration* in conditions: *forced displacement has risen by 85 %*, *confinement incidents by 12 %*, and *87 massacres have claimed 174 verified victims*.

These are *not isolated setbacks*, but *evidence* of a sustained pattern of grave violations. The report attributes 95 % of documented abuses to factors associated with the implementation of the “Total Peace” policy and notes that 75 % are linked to illicit economies that continue to drive territorial violence.

Together, these trends amount to the *second* most consequential outcome of Petro's government: *a deepening humanitarian and human rights crisis*.

Bogotá, Colombia, March 4, 2026.